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15. EQUITY AND TRUSTS 
TANG Hang Wu 
LLB (National University of Singapore),  
LLM, PhD (Cambridge); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Express trust 
15.1 MF Global Singapore Pte Ltd v Vintage Bullion DMCC [2015] 
4 SLR 831 (“MF Global”) is an important decision on the principles of 
the certainties required to settle an express trust. This case dealt with the 
aftermath of the insolvency of MF Global Singapore Pte Ltd (“MFGS”). 
Some customers had invested in MFGS and the issue was whether these 
investments were held on trust for these customers. Clause A15.1 of the 
Master Trade Agreement with the customer provided: 
15. TRUST ACCOUNT 
15.1 MFGS shall keep all funds and other assets held by MFGS on 
trust for the Customer separate from the funds and assets of MFGS. 
The Customer’s funds and assets shall be placed into a trust account, 
where they may be held commingled with excess funds or assets of 
other Customers in accordance with Applicable Laws. 
15.2 Hoo Sheau Peng JC made the following pertinent observations 
in relation to the principles applicable in determining whether there was 
a valid express trust. Her Honour said: 
(a) “an intention to create a trust may be inferred by 
examining evidence of the alleged settlor’s words and conduct as 
well as the circumstances surrounding the alleged express trust, 
and through the interpretations of any agreements that the 
parties might have entered into” (MF Global at [172]); 
(b) the commercial context of the parties’ relationship must 
be considered; 
(c) generally, the courts are disinclined to find a trust in 
everyday commercial context; 
(d) in order to displace the general disinclination, there 
must be clear evidence of an intention to create a trust; and 
(e) mere segregation of money by itself is not conclusive as 
to an intention to create a trust. 
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15.3 On the facts, Hoo JC held that MFGS’s intention to create an 
express trust for the customers in terms of the unrealised profits and 
forward value had not been proven. 
15.4 A dispute over a private equity arrangement gave rise to the 
decision of Cheong Soh Chin v Eng Chiet Shoong [2015] SGHC 173. In 
this case, the plaintiffs transferred more than US$100m to the 
defendants to invest in some private equity funds and direct 
investments. These investments were structured through a web of 
special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) controlled by the defendants. 
Unfortunately, the relationship between the parties soured and the 
plaintiffs sought from the defendants, inter alia, the following 
orders: (a) transfer of all the moneys and properties including the 
SPVs; (b) an account of all the moneys transferred to the defendants and 
SPVs; (c) a tracing order; and (d) a judgment of moneys due after the 
account. The learned judge held that the plaintiffs were entitled  
to (a), (b) and (d) but not the tracing order because this was premature. 
Vinodh Coomaraswamy J found that the defendants were the plaintiffs’ 
trustees either on a presumed resulting trust or an agency relationship 
to hold and manage the investments. As such, the defendants were 
under a duty to account to the plaintiffs. 
15.5 The express trust was also considered in Westacre Investments 
Inc v The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR [2015] 4 SLR 529 
(“Westacre Investments”). This case is significant because it suggests that 
a judgment creditor may garnish a bank account held by a bare trustee 
for a beneficiary who is a judgment debtor. Westacre Investments was a 
long running dispute and the plaintiff in this case obtained a judgment 
against the defendant in the English High Court for £41m. This 
judgment was registered in Singapore after the plaintiff discovered that 
the defendant’s subsidiary, Deuteron, maintained bank accounts in 
Singapore. The plaintiff contended that the money in this bank account 
was held on trust for the defendant. The plaintiff therefore garnished 
these bank accounts on the ground that the moneys belonged to the 
defendant. During the garnishee proceedings, three parties 
(“other parties”) claimed, inter alia, that the moneys belonged to them 
because there was an express trust in their favour. After examining the 
facts of the case, Edmund Leow JC held that the other parties merely 
had a contractual claim against the defendant. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the parties was governed by foreign law and there 
was no concept of beneficial interest under Yugoslav or Serbian law. It 
was unlikely that the parties intended for a trust relationship to arise. 
Even if Singapore law governed the relationship, Leow JC was not 
prepared to hold that there was sufficient certainty of intention to infer 
an express trust of the moneys for the other parties. The fact that the 
moneys were mixed and shifted between accounts demonstrated that 
there was no requisite certainty of intention to create a trust for the 
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other parties. On the facts, the learned judicial commissioner held that 
Deuteron was a bare trustee of the moneys for the defendant. In other 
words, the defendant had a right to collapse the trust vis-à-vis Deuteron. 
Therefore, Leow JC ordered that the garnishee order against Deuteron’s 
bank be made absolute. 
15.6 The issue of mental capacity to declare a trust came to the fore 
in Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81. This decision is a landmark decision on 
mental capacity and undue influence involving an elder. For the 
purposes of the review in this part, “P” refers to the person whose 
mental capacity to declare a trust was in question. This decision will no 
doubt be of interest to trust companies and banks that work with elderly 
clients. In Re BKR, the Court of Appeal could not discern any good 
reason for settling the trust concerned. P already had a pre-existing trust 
with another bank that could accomplish the stated purpose of the new 
trust. Sundaresh Menon CJ thought that P could achieve the same 
purposes by drawing up an appropriate will. Menon CJ was very careful 
to say that an unwise or imprudent decision to settle a trust did not 
mean that P lacked the capacity to declare a trust. The learned 
Chief Justice gave the following guidance on the mental capacity to 
declare a valid trust (Re BKR at [177]): 
But it is less clear whether she has the ability to use and weigh the 
information relevant to her decision to set up the Trust. What this 
requires of her is an ability to engage with the countervailing 
considerations relevant to the decision – pros and cons, costs and 
benefits – and to measure them one against another in a non-arbitrary 
manner. This is not to suggest that feelings and intuition ought never 
to play a part in the process of decision-making; taking for instance a 
man who spends a great deal of money participating in a lottery which 
he knows he has a miniscule chance of winning because he has a 
strong intuition that it will be his lucky day, we would not necessarily 
conclude that such a man lacks the ability to use and weigh the 
information relevant to the decision he has made. Human experience 
shows that we do make decisions on the basis of rational reasons as 
well as irrational impulses or instincts or feelings; and even though 
these rational and irrational factors may be incommensurables, the 
reality is that we have nonetheless to reckon with them in the same 
decision-making equation. What matters is the ability to engage with 
all these factors, rather than allowing one or some of them to 
dominate the decision-making process such that the other relevant 
factors are effectively excluded from that process. 
15.7 On the facts, P could not explain the reason for settling the 
trust. In fact, P’s primary reason for settling the trust was because she 
believed her son, CK, was after her money and would leave her bereft 
and destitute. On the facts, there was simply no evidence to support this 
belief. Therefore, Menon CJ surmised that the trust was motivated by an 
unfounded paranoid belief which arose due to P’s mental impairment. 
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15.8 Tanaka Lumber Pte Ltd v Datuk Haji Mohammad Tufail bin 
Mahmud [2015] SGHC 276 was a dispute on whether there was a trust 
over moneys which were transferred by the plaintiff company to the 
defendants who were directors of the plaintiff. The dispute between the 
parties was about the moneys that were transferred between 27 May 
1992 and 26 March 1996 from the plaintiff company, Tanaka Lumber 
Pte Ltd’s (“Tanaka”), HSBC accounts to the defendants. Tanaka claimed 
that the moneys were to be held on trust by the defendants for the 
purposes of Tanaka’s investments in Malaysia pursuant to two oral 
shareholders’ agreements in 1993 and 1994 to invest those moneys in 
two Malaysian companies. In contrast, the first defendant contended 
that the moneys were transferred to him as the beneficial owner and 
also made a counterclaim that there was a conspiracy to injure him. 
Edmund Leow JC found that the evidence adduced by both sides was 
unreliable and lacking credibility in material respects. Therefore, the 
judge dismissed both the claim and counterclaim. 
Resulting trust 
15.9 Ishak bin Abdul Kadir v Khoo Hui Ying [2015] SGHC 181 was a 
dispute over a condominium in Keppel Bay. The plaintiff and defendant 
were in a relationship and bought the property together for $1.568m. It 
was registered in both their names as joint tenants. A loan for 80% of the 
purchase price was procured from UOB by the parties as joint 
mortgagors. The remainder 20% of the purchase price was paid from the 
plaintiff ’s Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) ($46,100), the 
defendant’s CPF ($15,900) and cash ($251,600). It should be noted that 
the plaintiff and defendant had bought an earlier apartment together 
and made a profit from the sale of that apartment. Some of these 
proceeds were used to buy the Keppel Bay condominium. 
Unfortunately, their relationship broke down soon after they acquired 
the Keppel Bay condominium. The learned judge accepted the 
defendant’s version of the events. According to the defendant, the 
plaintiff offered the defendant joint ownership of the earlier property 
whereby the plaintiff would make all payments for the property 
(including the loan, property tax and maintenance) and the defendant 
would contribute in terms of utility bills and broadband subscription. 
The proposal was made because the plaintiff needed the defendant to 
become the co-borrower of the loan. By the time the Keppel Bay 
condominium was acquired, the parties’ relationship had become 
strained. The defendant permitted the proceeds of the earlier apartment 
to be used to acquire the Keppel Bay condominium on the agreement 
that should the relationship come to an end, the defendant would not 
lay a claim for a half share of the Keppel Bay condominium; instead, the 
plaintiff would pay the defendant a half share of the sale proceeds from 
the earlier property. In contrast, the plaintiff disavowed any prior 
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agreement and said that he did not understand the significance of 
agreeing to register the Keppel Bay condominium in joint names. 
Lee Seiu Kin J placed emphasis on the fact that the implications of a 
joint tenancy were explained to the plaintiff when the Keppel Bay 
condominium was bought. In particular, the plaintiff signed a form 
where a detailed explanation of the concept of joint tenancy and tenancy 
in common was clearly stated. The learned judge did not allow the 
plaintiff ’s resulting trust claim. Lee J ordered the plaintiff to repay the 
defendant’s CPF moneys and also the proceeds of the sale from the 
earlier apartment. Once this was done, the defendant would have to 
convey the property to the plaintiff. 
15.10 Lim Giok Boon v Lim Geok Cheng [2015] SGHC 208 was a 
dispute between sisters who had joint business and property interests 
over a long period of time. One sister, Una, had extended some money 
to the other sister, Lena, in relation to the purchase of a condominium 
in a development called Edelweiss. The property was bought and 
registered solely in Lena’s name. One of the issues was whether a 
resulting trust arose in this context. Turning to the beneficial interest 
claimed in the flat, Vinodh Coomaraswamy J emphasised the general 
rule in Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 that 
“contributions have to be applied towards the purchase price”. On this 
ground, the plaintiff ’s claim based on a resulting trust failed as the 
contributions were made to assist the defendant with her purchase, by 
reducing the amount of mortgage interest payable. Further, the purchase 
was intended as an investment for the defendant and for her to own it 
absolutely at law and in equity. The contributions were therefore more 
appropriately characterised as loans which do not attract proprietary 
consequences. There was no question of a resulting trust arising in Una’s 
favour. 
15.11 Lee Yee Mui v Chau Hong Loan [2015] SGHC 314 involved a 
claim by the plaintiff, who was the mother-in-law of the defendant. The 
plaintiff and the defendant bought a unit in Toh Tuck Lodge in 2003 and 
registered it in joint tenancy. Subsequently, the plaintiff severed the joint 
tenancy in 2011. The plaintiff ’s case was that there was no clear evidence 
of (a) the defendant’s direct financial contributions towards the 
purchase price; or (b) any common intention that the beneficial interest 
was to be held differently from the legal interest. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff argued that she was entitled to a half share of the property. In 
contrast, the defendant contended that she had contributed to the entire 
amount of the purchase price of the property. On the evidence before 
the court, the learned judge agreed with the plaintiff ’s case.  
Chua Lee Ming JC held that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share of 
the net proceeds of the sale of the property. 
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15.12 In Kua Tee Beng v Ye Caiyan [2015] SGHC 53, the plaintiff and 
defendant were engaged in a two-year intimate relationship. When the 
relationship ended, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the 
defendant seeking, inter alia, a resulting trust over a property registered 
in the defendant’s name. It is undisputed that the plaintiff contributed 
$295,000 to the purchase of the property registered in the defendant’s 
sole name. George Wei JC applied Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun 
[2014] 3 SLR 1048 and found that the presumption of a resulting trust 
was rebutted in this case. The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff ’s 
uncorroborated evidence that his contribution to the property was 
intended to serve as an investment. Instead, the evidence revealed that 
the plaintiff did not display any interest in the property at the point of 
acquisition and, in the light of the parties’ romantic relationship, it was 
not implausible that the plaintiff had intended to benefit the defendant 
with the entire $295,000. Therefore, the plaintiff ’s claim for a resulting 
trust failed. 
15.13 Tan Chin Hoon v Tan Choo Suan [2016] 1 SLR 1150 (“Tan Chin 
Hoon”) (see [2015] SGHC 306 for the complete text of the unreported 
version of the judgment) was a lengthy and protracted family dispute. 
This case is significant for the consideration of the evidential rule in 
Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431 and the limitation period in 
relation to a resulting trust claim. In the past, it was thought that a “well-
settled principle” was that only events constituting part of the original 
transaction can be admitted into evidence to displace the presumption 
of advancement (see Lynton Tucker, et al, Lewin on Trusts  
(Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2015) at para 9-036 and Snell’s Equity  
(John McGhee ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Ed, 2014) at para 25-013), as 
the inquiry is directed at whether a gift was intended at the time of the 
transaction. Evidence of future dealings and statements should be 
excluded. Such evidence often does not relate to the state of mind of the 
parties at the material time. This strict rule was highlighted in 
Shephard v Cartwright (for a fuller exploration of this issue,  
see M Yip & J Lee, “‘Less than Straightforward’ People, Facts and Trusts: 
Reflections on Context” [2013] Conv 431). In Shepard v Cartwright, 
a father purchased shares in the name of his children. He dealt with 
these shares and the proceeds of those shares without the informed 
consent of his children (though he occasionally did get their signatures). 
After his death, his children sought an account. His executors sought to 
prove that the presumption of advancement was rebutted and that the 
shares and their proceeds really belonged to the estate. Among the 
evidence was a course of dealings, starting from five years after the 
shares were purchased, where the father consistently dealt with a 
substantial portion of the shares and their proceeds as though they were 
his own. The House of Lords considered this evidence to be 
inadmissible, as it was not connected with the original transaction. It 
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did not go to show that at the point of purchase, the father (or his 
children) did not consider the purchase to be a gift. 
15.14 However, in United Overseas Bank Ltd v Giok Bie Jao [2012] 
SGHC 56 at [16], Belinda Ang J suggested that a looser approach should 
be adopted, approving the following passage from Snell’s Equity 
(John McGhee ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 32nd Ed, 2010) at para 25-013: 
The preferable approach nowadays may be to treat the parties’ 
subsequent conduct as admissible even in their own favour, and to 
leave the court free to assess its probative weight. This approach would 
be consistent with the looser significance attached to the presumptions 
of resulting trust and of advancement in the modern authorities. 
15.15 In Tan Chin Hoon, Vinodh Coomaraswamy J was supportive of 
Belinda Ang J’s approach. Coomaraswamy J sensibly commented 
(Tan Chin Hoon at [195]): 
[Ang J’s] approach is not inconsistent with the general rule insofar as it 
accommodates the caution with which a court must approach 
subsequent self-serving declarations, because of the risk of a party 
using post-transaction declarations with hindsight to recast their 
initial intent in order to bolster the case they now advance. The 
principle that self-serving evidence is of little probative value 
underpins both the established approach which excludes it entirely 
and the new approach which makes its self-serving potential 
ultimately a matter of weight. 
15.16 Another important point about Tan Chin Hoon is that Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy J held that claims for resulting trusts are not subject to 
the six-year limitation period in s 22(2) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 
1996 Rev Ed) as they fall within the scope of s 22(1)(b) of the Limitation 
Act. 
15.17 Tien Choon Kuan v Tien Chwan Hoa [2016] SGHC 16 
(“Tien Choon Kuan”) is a difficult case dealing with the relationship 
between a joint tenancy and resulting trust. This decision is an 
interlocutory judgment where Choo Han Teck J refused to give 
judgment in default of appearance. There are several important aspects 
of the case although these observations are obiter dicta. First, the learned 
judge correctly said that the severance of a joint tenancy at law through 
unilateral declaration pursuant to s 53 of the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 
2004 Rev Ed) does not preclude a court from declaring that the 
co-owners hold the property in shares proportionate to their initial 
contributions to the purchase price in equity. Second, Choo J said that 
there are legislative and social policies which might contradict the use of 
a resulting trust over Housing and Development Board flats (see 
generally H W Tang, “Housing and Development Board Flats, Trust and 
Other Equitable Doctrines” (2012) 24 SAcLJ 470). These issues must be 
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determined at trial and cannot be swept aside under an application for 
default judgment. Third, the issue of the intention of the parties is 
crucial in determining a claim based on resulting trust. Since the 
evidence on the current facts was sparse and untested by 
cross-examination, Choo J declined to enter judgment on default of 
appearance. Finally, Choo J also observed tentatively (Tien Choon Kuan 
at [13]): 
[I]n an appropriate case, a conscious decision to unilaterally sever a 
joint tenancy as tenants in common in equal shares may give rise to an 
inference of fact that the purchaser had always intended to give to the 
other party a 50% share of the property, even though that party may 
have contributed less to the purchase price. 
15.18 The issues identified by Choo Han Teck J are unfortunately very 
common in these disputes. No doubt these issues will have to be 
ventilated more fully in another forum. 
Fiduciary relationships 
15.19 Nava Bharat (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Straits Law Practice LLC 
[2015] SGHC 146 is a decision which traverses many areas of the law. In 
this review, the focus is on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The 
plaintiff had sued his lawyer, R, for, inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty 
because the counterparty was represented by his brother-in-law, C. This 
was argued to be a conflict of interests. Lee Seiu Kin J went through the 
law methodically and held that there was no breach of fiduciary duty in 
this context. The learned judge said that the cases on conflict may be 
divided into two categories: (a) conflict of duty and interest; 
and (b) conflict of duty and duty. With regard to conflict of duty and 
interest, the cases may be seen as a duty not to make unauthorised 
remuneration, engage in self-dealing and engage in fair-dealing. The 
latter category of conflict of duty and duty deals with the issue of double 
employment where the fiduciary acts for two principals with conflicting 
interests. Lee J said that a mere assertion of conflict of interests is not 
sufficient. The plaintiff must be able to identify the conflict of interests. 
On the facts, the learned judge could not find a conflict of interests just 
because R and C were brothers-in-law. It should be noted that the Court 
of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
15.20 Dynasty Line v Sukamto Sia [2015] SGHC 286 considered the 
issue of equitable compensation payable by a fiduciary to his principal 
for a breach of fiduciary duty. In this case, the fiduciaries, Sia and Lee, 
were the only two directors of a British Virgin Island (“BVI”) company 
called Dynasty Line. Sia used Dynasty Line to acquire the shareholding 
of a Hong Kong listed company, CDC. Although only a fraction of the 
purchase price was paid, the vendors of the CDC shares transferred the 
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shares to Dynasty Line. Sia subsequently caused the shares in CDC to be 
pledged to various financial institutions as security for loans to Sia and 
his business associates. It must be noted that Lee did not sign any of 
these pledges save for a pledge to Commerzbank. The vendors of 
the CDC shares obtained judgment against Dynasty Line for the unpaid 
shares. Dynasty Line was wound up and its liquidators brought an 
action against Sia and Lee for breach of fiduciary duty. The claim was 
successful and the present proceeding was to consider the amount of 
compensation that Sia and Lee would have to pay Dynasty Line. As a 
matter of English and BVI law, Lai Siu Chiu SJ said that the law imposes 
joint and several liabilities on company directors. The learned judge did 
not agree with the BVI expert’s contention that it was possible to 
apportion liability between company directors where one director is 
more culpable than the other directors. Another important aspect of this 
case is the issue of causation, ie, did Lee’s breach of fiduciary duty cause 
the loss to Dynasty Line? Lee contended that even if he did not sign the 
Commerzbank pledge, Sia would have been able to execute the 
mortgage. Lee pointed out that Sia had executed mortgages for other 
financial institutions without his signature. It is interesting to note that 
Lai SJ thought that BVI law was the same as English law which requires 
a plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection between the fiduciary 
breach and the loss complained of. The learned judge applied the “but 
for” test of causation in this context. Lai SJ held that the “but for” cause 
in this case was satisfied since Lee signed the Commerzbank pledge. 
Lai SJ characterised Lee’s defence as being based on a “hypothetical loss” 
situation. In other words, even if Lee did not sign the Commerzbank 
pledge, Sia would have executed the pledge by himself. On the evidence, 
Lai SJ did not accept that the “hypothetical loss” situation was proven. 
15.21 Having dealt with the causation point, the learned judge then 
went on to deal with the thorny issue of the time at which the 
compensation should be assessed. It was accepted that if the CDC shares 
were not pledged away, Dynasty Line would have sold those shares. The 
question was this: what is the date on which the shares would have been 
sold? The liquidators contended that the relevant date was the date on 
which the shares were pledged away whereas Lee argued that the 
relevant date was the date on which the vendors of the CDC shares 
entered judgment against Dynasty Line. Lai SJ reviewed the facts very 
carefully and thought that it was very unlikely that Sia and Lee would 
have sold the shares off earlier. The learned judge held that the shares 
would be pegged to the date of April 2011, ie, the date on which the 
vendors of the CDC shares entered judgment against Dynasty Line. 
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Unconscionable receipt and dishonest assistance 
15.22 M+W Singapore Pte Ltd v Leow Tet Sin [2015] 2 SLR 271 is an 
illustration of how a company director may be personally liable if the 
company acted in breach of trust. In this case, the plaintiff company was 
a construction company employed by another company called JDD to 
construct a data centre. The defendants were the only two directors 
of JDD and joint signatories to its bank account. JDD was in financial 
trouble and an arrangement was reached whereby JDD provided the 
plaintiff with a debenture. Under the terms of the debenture, JDD 
agreed that the plaintiff would have a first fixed charge over all JDD’s 
“monetary claims” and the money would be placed in a claims account. 
After the debenture was granted, the Inland Revenue Authority of 
Singapore (“IRAS”) paid JDD a goods and services tax (“GST”) refund 
of over $6m. These moneys were not put in a separate bank account but 
instead mixed with JDD’s own bank account. JDD subsequently became 
financially distressed and a receiver and manager was appointed. In 
earlier court proceedings, the court found that the legal effect of the 
debenture was that JDD had given a fixed charge over the GST to the 
plaintiff. Since JDD did not pay the GST refund into a separate bank 
account, it held the moneys on constructive trust for the plaintiff. In this 
action, the plaintiff sued the defendant directors of JDD for, inter alia, 
dishonest assistance of a breach of trust. Judith Prakash J applied the test 
set out in George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 
at [22], ie, a person must have knowledge of the irregular shortcomings 
of the transaction that ordinary honest people would consider it to be a 
breach of honest conduct if he or she failed to enquire about them. 
Prakash J affirmed that the test with regard to dishonesty is an objective 
one. The learned judge said that there is a two-stage analysis for 
dishonest assistance: (a) what did the person know of the transaction; 
and (b) did participation in the transaction with that knowledge offend 
ordinary standards? It is only when both elements are satisfied that a 
person would be guilty of dishonest assistance. On the facts, Prakash J 
held that the defendants knew of the breach of the terms of the 
debenture and their conduct offended ordinary standards. Therefore, 
the learned judge held that the defendants were guilty of dishonest 
assistance of a breach of trust. 
Proprietary estoppel 
15.23 The law of pleadings in relation to a claim in proprietary 
estoppel was considered in V Nithia v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam 
[2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”). In this case, the High Court reached a 
decision based on proprietary estoppel which was not specifically 
pleaded by the respondent. Instead, the respondents pleaded resulting 
trust. At the end of the trial, the trial judge invited the parties to submit 
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their case on the basis of a claim in proprietary estoppel. After hearing 
the submissions, the trial judge dismissed the claim on resulting trust 
but upheld a claim premised on proprietary estoppel. The Court of 
Appeal reversed the High Court’s decision and held that “proprietary 
estoppel should be pleaded expressly and the facts relevant to each 
element should be pleaded specifically”. Chan Sek Keong SJ pointed out 
that there were significant differences in the factual underpinnings 
between a case of resulting trust and proprietary estoppel and that these 
differences were not simply a matter of law. Unlike proprietary estoppel, 
a resulting trust did not require an assurance or representation by the 
defendant. The appellant suffered prejudice because the trial and 
cross-examination would have taken on a different turn had proprietary 
estoppel been pleaded. Chan SJ said that this did not mean that a judge 
must always bite his or her tongue and never invite the parties to 
reframe their pleadings. The learned judge gave the following guidance 
as to when this is permitted (V Nithia at [61]): 
The court may express its wish that the parties reframe the issues so 
that the case may be better decided. However, if a court raises a new 
issue or a new cause of action on its own motion after hearing the 
evidence at trial, good order requires that the court invite the parties 
to amend their pleadings and for the party affected by this issue be 
allowed to re-examine the witnesses and/or to call rebuttal evidence 
on the hereinbefore unexplored point. However, the court must bear 
in mind that such a step may not be taken if it causes irreparable 
damage to the other party, ie, damage that cannot be compensated by 
an order for costs thrown away. 
15.24 V Nithia is also interesting because it hints at the relationship 
between the application of equitable principles and relevant statutory 
provisions (see the framework proposed in H W Tang, “Equity in the 
Age of Statutes” (2015) 9 Journal of Equity 214 (“H W Tang”)). The 
appellant tried to argue that a claim in proprietary estoppel was 
precluded by ss 6(d) and 7 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed). 
Without expressing any final views on this issue because the Court of 
Appeal had found in the appellant’s favour on the grounds of pleading, 
Chan SJ said (V Nithia at [74]): 
The issue of the court subverting or repealing the statutory formalities 
does not arise unless the policy as expressed in the legislation is so 
clear that there can only be one answer to the question. Equity cannot 
contradict a statute, but only when the statute may not be 
contradicted. This is an issue of statutory interpretation to determine 
what the legislative policy is. A claim based on proprietary estoppel 
may or may not be consistent with the policy of the legislation. 
15.25 Tan Bee Hoon v Quek Hung Heong [2015] SGHC 229 (“Tan Bee 
Hoon”) is noteworthy because Aedit Abdullah JC distinguished between 
three different kinds of estoppel: (a) cause of action estoppel/issue 
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estoppel; (b) proprietary estoppel; and (c) promissory estoppel. The 
learned judicial commissioner said that in category (a), the estoppel 
deals with the binding effect of a previous decision. According to 
Abdullah JC (Tan Bee Hoon at [13]): 
Proprietary estoppel operates to give effect to what is held out even to 
the extent of affecting the proprietary rights of the implicated party. 
Promissory estoppel protects an expectation of forbearance in an 
existing relationship. 
15.26 The learned judicial commissioner said that while these 
doctrines might share some common elements like representation, 
reliance and detriment, it is inadvisable to conflate the various forms of 
estoppel because there are significant differences between them. On the 
facts of this case, the plaintiff was not entitled to bring a claim in 
proprietary estoppel because this was a claim that the plaintiff could 
have brought up in an earlier proceeding. Even if the plaintiff could raise 
a claim in proprietary estoppel, Abdullah JC thought that the elements 
of the claim were not satisfied in the present case. 
Quistclose trust/application of trust principles to a town council 
15.27 The case Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East 
Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 (“Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town 
Council”) is a case dealing primarily with the financial affairs of a town 
council. However, the High Court made some interesting observations 
about the jurisprudential basis of the Quistclose trust. In this case, the 
plaintiff, the Ministry of National Development (“MND”), took the 
defendant, a town council, to task over the state of the town council’s 
financial affairs. MND who provided grants to the town council filed an 
application to the court to appoint independent accountants to audit the 
affairs of the town council. Much of the case deals with the intricacies of 
the Town Council Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) and will not be 
reviewed here. The pertinent part of the judgment is MND’s reliance on 
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 for the 
proposition that MND had an interest in the funds disbursed with the 
mutual intention that the money would be used for a specific purpose. 
Quentin Loh J adopted Lord Millett’s rationalisation of the Quistclose 
trust in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 (“Twinsectra”). The 
learned judge also went on to consider the jurisprudential basis of the 
Quistclose trust. Loh J helpfully summarised the principles governing 
the Quistclose trust as follows (Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town 
Council at [114]): 
(a) Whenever a donor transfers money to a recipient for a 
specified purpose, a Quistclose trust may arise. In a Quistclose trust, 
the donor possesses the beneficial interest in the money, but this is 
subject to a power or duty on the recipient’s part to use the money for 
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the specified purpose. If the recipient is unwilling or unable to use the 
money for the specified purpose, the money is to be returned to the 
donor. Such a trust may be either express or resulting. 
(b) For a Quistclose trust to arise, the twin certainties of subject 
matter and objects must be present. In particular, the purpose must be 
stated with sufficient clarity for a court to determine if it is still capable 
of being carried out or if the money has been misapplied. 
(c) For an express Quistclose trust, the settlor-donor must intend 
to constitute the recipient as a trustee, and confer a power or duty on 
the recipient-trustee to apply the money exclusively in accordance 
with the stated purpose. 
(d) For a resulting Quistclose trust to arise, the donor must have a 
lack of intention to part with the entire beneficial interest in the 
transferred money. The recipient must not have free disposal of the 
money (Twinsectra at [73]) and must be under a power or duty to 
apply the money exclusively in accordance with the stated purpose 
(Twinsectra at [74]). 
15.28 On appeal, the Court of Appeal (Attorney-General v 
Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 
(“Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council (CA)”)) rejected MND’s 
plea using private law principles in this context. Sundaresh Menon CJ 
held that the entire relationship between MND and the town council 
arose from the Town Council Act and therefore this relationship could 
only be analysed by reference to the Town Council Act. The 
Chief Justice said (Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council (CA) 
at [123]): 
[W]e do not think that it can fundamentally alter the very basis of the 
relationship from one founded in and regulated by statute to one in 
trust, agency or any other private law concept. It is not appropriate, on 
the facts of the present case, to add such private law overlays to the 
statutory relationship between the Minister and the Town Councils. 
Indeed, there is nothing at all in the TCA to suggest otherwise. 
15.29 The Court of Appeal’s decision illustrates the tricky interplay 
between statute and equitable principles. Evidently, in certain 
circumstances, it is not appropriate to overlay private law concepts onto 
statutory relationships (explored in H W Tang (above, para 15.24)). 
Since the Court of Appeal rejected the application of private law 
concepts in this context, it is also unclear as to the precedential effect of 
Quentin Loh J’s observations on the Quistclose trust. No doubt this 
difficult topic will have to be reconsidered in a future decision, 
especially the issue of discovering the intention of the parties in the 
creation of the Quistclose trust (see J Penner, “Lord Millett’s Analysis in 
The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays” (Hart Publishing, 2004) at 41 
and A See, “The Quistclose Trust in Singapore” (2014) 20(4) Trusts and 
Trustees 362. See also the High Court of Australia’s recent judgment in 
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Korda v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd [2015] HCA 6 on 
certainty of intention to create a trust in a commercial context). 
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